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“Innovation, by its nature, does not always fit within existing 
structures.” 
  —Turo CEO, Andre Haddad1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Airbnb, Uber, Eatwith, and other sharing economy2 platforms 
facilitate short-term rentals, transportation, meals, and even pet-
sharing.  The platforms in the sharing economy use technology to 
connect people who have private excess capacity to those who want to 
purchase it.  Rather than staying in a hotel, customers can stay in a 
spare bedroom through Airbnb; rather than hiring moving 
companies, customers can get help moving via TaskRabbit; rather 
than going to a restaurant, customers can have a meal prepared for 
them in someone’s home via Eatwith. 
TIME Magazine listed the sharing economy as one of the ten ideas 
that will change the world,3 and Forbes estimates that the revenue 
flowing through the sharing economy surpassed $3.5 billion in 2013, 
with growth exceeding twenty-five percent per year.4  At that rate, 
peer-to-peer sharing has moved beyond a fringe movement and into a 
disruptive economic force.  Look only to Airbnb, which at six years 
                                                                                                                             
 1. Andre Haddad, New York Rentals Suspended Until Further Notice, TURO 
BLOG (May 15, 2013), https://blog.turo.com/news/new-york-rentals-suspended-until-
further-notice [https://perma.cc/HA8S-K938]. 
 2. Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST 
COMPANY (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-
lacks-a-shared-definition#8 [perma.cc/4UNG-29F2] (explaining that the “sharing 
economy” goes by many names, such as “collaborative consumption,” “the peer-to-
peer economy,” and “the 1099 economy”).  This Article uses the term “sharing 
economy” to refer to the peer-to-peer networks facilitated by platforms that allow 
people to profit from their excess capacity. 
 3. Bryan Walsh, Today’s Smart Choice: Don’t Own. Share, TIME (Mar. 17, 
2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0%2C28804%2C2059521_2059
717_2059710%2C00.html. 
 4. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Sharing Economy, 
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-
and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/. 
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old had a valuation of $13 billion,5 much higher than the Hyatt hotel 
chain ($7 billion),6 and Uber, which at four years old had a valuation 
of $40 billion, greater than Hertz,7 Avis,8 and Enterprise9 combined.10 
Companies using this relatively new business model have faced 
innumerable legal challenges.  In some places, platforms are simply 
banned from operating;11 in others, supply-side users12 or the 
platforms themselves are fined.13  The reason for the difficulty and 
uncertainty is that the sharing economy is in a “betwixt and between 
space”—it does not fit within existing legal frameworks.  Platforms 
view themselves as online companies regulated by Internet law, 
though they execute mostly in the offline world.14  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                             
 5. Ankit Ajmera, Airbnb Valued at $13 Billion as It Discusses Employee Stock 
Sale: WSJ, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/us-
airbnb-financing-idUSKCN0ID03420141024#yCEcMQMVTAZeIx6w.97 
[perma.cc/L6YH-8GR5]. 
 6. Hyatt Hotels Selected Fundamentals, MACROAXIS, 
http://www.macroaxis.com/invest/ratio/H—Current-Valuation [perma.cc/G4WX-
SVLW]. 
 7. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., YAHOO! FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=HTZ+Key+Statistics (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 8. Avis Budget Group Inc., MARKETWATCH, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/car (last visited May 20, 2015). 
 9. America’s Largest Private Companies: #16 Enterprise Holdings, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/companies/enterprise-holdings/ (last visited May 20, 2015). 
 10. Note these valuations have been hotly contested. See generally Sarah Cannon 
& Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can Win Over 
Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-
the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/ [perma.cc/2W58-3KMK]; Neil Irwin, 
Can Uber Live Up to Its $40 Billion Valuation, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/upshot/ubers-real-challenge-leveraging-the-
network-effect.html?_r=1&abt=0002&abg=0; Maxwell Wessel, Making Sense of 
Uber’s $40 Billion Valuation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 10, 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/12/making-sense-of-ubers-40-billion-valuation [perma.cc/G7R4-
V7XA]. 
 11. For example, Little Rock, AK; Las Vegas, NV; and Portland, OR, have 
banned Uber. Laurie Kulikowski, Uber Banned in 5 U.S. Cities That Want Your 
Taxi Business, MAINSTREET (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.mainstreet.com/article/uber-
banned-in-5-us-cities-that-want-your-taxi-business/page/2 [perma.cc/5TQN-WBCF]. 
 12. Throughout this Article, the term “supply-side user” refers to the providers of 
services via the sharing platforms. 
 13. See Ron Lieber, A $2,400 Fine for an Airbnb Host, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 
2013), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/a-2400-fine-for-an-airbnb-
host/?_r=0 [perma.cc/BR6P-4JDA]; Edward Russo, Register-Guard: City Fines Uber 
Over Licensing Violation, OPB (Nov. 20, 2014) 
http://www.opb.org/news/article/register-guard-eugene-fines-uber-over-licensing-
violation/ [perma.cc/4MW7-29TX]. 
 14. Claire C. Miller, Is Owning Overrated? The Rental Economy Rises, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/upshot/is-owning-
overrated-the-rental-economy-rises.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&abt=0002&abg=0. 
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sharing economy platforms are facilitating transactions that have 
always been legal but are now executed on such a large scale that the 
potential for harm to the public is very real.  What are the rules when 
the lines blur between giving a friend a ride to the airport and 
operating as a professional driver? 
This Article argues that existing laws cannot effectively regulate 
the sharing economy because the sharing economy is uniquely 
comprised of individuals profiting from their personal excess capacity.  
These individuals operate microbusinesses, which cannot, without 
devastating consequences, be regulated like traditional businesses.  
This Article proposes a shift in liability rules to mitigate the harm 
caused by market defects in the sharing economy. 
This Article is divided into four parts.  Part I outlines the evolution 
of the sharing economy, its benefits, and two sharing economy 
platforms, Airbnb and Uber.  Part II defines the sharing economy and 
describes the current regulatory environment governing it.  Part III 
proposes a method to achieve many of the goals of regulation in a 
manner that balances protection of users, consumers, and existing 
businesses with the need to support innovation and microbusiness.  
The Article concludes with recommendations for further research. 
I.  THE DISRUPTIVE EVOLUTION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 
Humans have always exchanged goods and services.  However, 
new sharing economy markets enabled by technology and the free 
flow of information present a new form of market that is difficult to 
conceptualize.15  The sharing economy is a disruptive force that 
facilitates exchanges involving underutilized assets, from spaces to 
skills to things, for monetary gain on a scale that would not be 
achievable without modern technology.16  This system facilitates 
localized production, cooperation, and the proliferation of 
microbusinesses,17 which allows consumer needs to be met by a large 
                                                                                                                             
 15. See id.  
 16. See Botsman, supra note 2.  Note, Botsman includes nonmonetary gain in her 
definition of the sharing economy, while this Article does not. 
 17. What is a Microbusiness?, SMALL BIZ CONNECT, 
http://toolkit.smallbiz.nsw.gov.au/part/20/99/449 [perma.cc/AMU3-Y27U].  They 
operate as microbusinesses, which are the very smallest of businesses with little 
overhead and capital. See id.  The owners of microbusinesses act as managers and are 
responsible for all aspects of the business not outsourced to platforms. See id.  
Because margins are so thin for these microbusinesses and resources are limited, they 
must not be overly burdened with regulations. See id.  As discussed in greater detail 
in the parts below, many people are involved in the sharing economy at a micro level, 
offering whatever excess capacity they personally have. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.   
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cross-section of society.18  This ease of access is made possible by 
platform companies, which are the businesses that broker the 
transactions.19 
A. The Driving Forces Behind the Sharing Economy 
The sharing economy in its current form began making waves at 
the turn of the century.20  There are three interconnected forces that 
gave rise to the sharing economy: modern trust, technology, and 
economic pressure. 
1. Modern Trust 
Many companies in the sharing economy facilitate behaviors that 
previously would have seemed unthinkable or foolish.  People are 
hopping into strangers’ cars (Lyft, Sidecar, Uber), welcoming others 
into their spare rooms (Airbnb), and dropping off dogs at unfamiliar 
houses (DogVacay, Rover).  The sharing economy requires 
individuals to trust complete strangers.  Trusting strangers is not only 
an economic breakthrough; it is also a cultural one “enabled by a 
sophisticated series of mechanisms, algorithms, and finely calibrated 
systems of rewards and punishments.”21 
Notably, the concept of facilitating economic relationships by 
sharing with strangers is not a newly developed concept; it is, rather, a 
return to an older one.  Before the Industrial Revolution, sharing was 
common.  It was acceptable to borrow someone’s tool, horse, or spare 
bed, because Americans tended to cluster in small towns and farming 
communities, where people built tight-knit relationships over the 
course of many years.22  In this system, there were natural incentives 
to treat people well, because if you developed a bad reputation, no 
one would want to share with you.23 
                                                                                                                             
 18. See Benita Matofska, What Is the Sharing Economy?, THE PEOPLE WHO 
SHARE, http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/ 
[perma.cc/CXF9-E4NK]. 
 19. This Article does not include peer-to-peer goods-marketplaces, such as eBay, 
in its definition of the sharing economy because those sites generally do not deal in 
the sale or rental of personal excess capacity. 
 20. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),  
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-
sharing-economy [perma.cc/EJ6G-HM69]. 
 21. Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each 
Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-
economy/ [perma.cc/63UV-DUB7]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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This economic system started to change around the mid-nineteenth 
century.  When Americans moved from small towns to cities, people 
could no longer rely on interpersonal relationships or cultural norms 
to safeguard their transactions, because they did not know, and often 
had never met, the people with whom they were doing business.24  
The result, Lynne Zucker has argued, was the destruction of trust.25 
As a result of this trust shift, formal systems sprang up as proxies 
for the trust that citizens had lost in one another.  Between 1870 and 
1920, a series of laws were enacted to establish a framework of rules 
and backstops designed to produce trust.  These included many 
permissions-based systems of licensing, inspecting, and permitting.26  
“Through institutionalizing socially created mechanisms for 
producing trust,” Zucker writes, “the economic order was gradually 
reconstructed.”27  The combination of laws and facilitators replaced 
the “casual, intimate, interpersonal form of trust” of small towns.28 
The problem, however, with this “institutionalized trust” is that it is 
incredibly burdensome.  Think about the hoops an entrepreneur 
starting a simple granola company has to jump through just to prove 
to the government that it is “ready” to operate: find or build a 
commercial kitchen, secure a food establishment license, secure a 
business license, secure a tax identification number, complete food 
safety and sanitation training, comply with Food and Drug 
Administration regulations and Department of Agriculture 
regulations regarding labeling, etc.29  These regulations are designed 
to ensure that the granola manufacturer will provide safe food, inform 
the public about its product, pay necessary taxes, etc.  All of these 
ends are worthy and give consumers a strong sense that the food they 
eat is safe.30 
                                                                                                                             
 24. Id. 
 25. Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic 
Structure 1840–1920, at 2 (RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV., Working Paper No. 82, 
1986) in 8 Research in Organizational Behavior (L.L. Cummings & Barry Staw eds., 
1985). 
 26. Nick Grossman, White Paper: Regulation, the Internet Way, DATA-SMART 
CITY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 8, 2015), http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-
paper-regulation-the-internet-way-660 [perma.cc/8WYG-C9HK]. 
 27. See Zucker, supra note 25, at 4. 
 28. See Tanz, supra note 21. 
 29. See generally IDAHO STATE DEP’T OF AGRIC., STARTING A SPECIALTY FOODS 
BUSINESS IN IDAHO (2010). 
 30. Seventy-eight percent of Americans are very or somewhat confident in the 
safety of the U.S. food supply. Food Insight, 2012 Food & Health Survey: Consumer 
Attitudes Towards Food Safety, Nutrition & Health, INT’L FOOD INFORMATION 
COUNCIL FOUND. (May 22, 2012), http://www.foodinsight.org 
2016] BETWIXT AND BETWEEN 37 
Peer-to-peer companies do not need such a complicated series of 
regulations or assurances to build trust, because they create and 
utilize what this Article calls “modern trust.”  Modern trust is built on 
a feedback loop system of ratings and reviews, as first utilized 
effectively by eBay.31  In 1995, eBay developed a highly successful 
online platform where individuals create accounts to enable the 
buying and selling of items through an online auction process.32  eBay 
creator, Pierre Omidyar, recognized the vast potential of the Internet 
and the absence of a virtual secondhand market.33  While some of 
eBay’s success could certainly be attributed to luck,34 there is no 
doubt that eBay tapped unrealized potential.35  There were two needs 
identified: first, the need for a place where people could buy and sell 
directly from one another online, and second, the need for peer-
reviews and community enforceability.36 
Mr. Omidyar and his eBay team quickly discovered the truth of 
these needs when it became apparent that community members might 
behave in a fraudulent, or simply lazy, manner.  For example, in 2002, 
a few short years after eBay’s launch the United States National 
Fraud Information Center reported that eighty-seven percent of 
complaints involved online auction transactions.37  In addition, in 
2000, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received more than 
25,000 complaints for web-based auction fraud, an increase from only 
100 complaints in 1997.38 
Trust had to be systematically “built in” to eBay.  Therefore, 
Omidyar’s team created a mechanism for a feedback loop that 
                                                                                                                             
/2012_Food_Health_Survey_Consumer_Attitudes_toward_Food_Safety_Nutrition_a
nd_Health#sthash.OVA320d6.dpuf [perma.cc/54WP-4SSX]. 
 31. See ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 26–29 (2008). 
 32. Id. at 25. 
 33. See id. at 19–20. 
 34. See id. at 19. 
 35. eBay’s 2014 first quarter (April) revenue is reported as $4.26 billion, slightly 
higher than the expected $4.23 billion. See Jillian D’Onfro, eBay Beats on Earnings, 
Stock down Slightly, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/ebay-q1-earnings-2014-4 [perma.cc/AA5U-V5H5]. 
 36. Andrés Guadamuz González, PayPal and eBay: The Legal Implications of the 
C2C Electronic Commerce Model, 18TH BILETA CONFERENCE: CONTROLLING INFO. 
IN THE ONLINE ENV’T 1, 2 (Apr. 2003), 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20papers/2003/PayPal%20and%20
eBay%20-
%20The%20Legal%20Implications%20of%20the%20C2C%20Elctronic%20Comm
erce%20Model.pdf [perma.cc/7R6R-HQ35]. 
 37. See id. at 3; see also Online Auction Fraud Skyrocketing in 2002, NAT’L 
CONSUMERS LEAGUE (Aug. 2002), http://www.nclnet.org/fraudweek2.htm. 
 38. See id. at 3. 
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allowed buyers and sellers to rate one another.39  They also “began 
monitoring the activity across the eBay marketplace, flagging 
potentially problematic sellers or buyers, providing its own payment 
options, and eventually guaranteeing every purchase.”40  In so doing, 
eBay created a new system that served as a trust proxy.  The new 
system did not require people to trust one another, because people 
could rely on a crowd-sourced, centralized system of feedback to 
protect their interests.41  This trust proxy was to the Internet age what 
complex business regulations, institutional banking, and insurance 
were to the early twentieth century.  As described in the sections 
below,42 sharing economy platforms use the same centralized systems 
of ratings and reviews as eBay to protect customers and create 
modern trust. 
2. Technology 
Technology is essential for the development of the sharing 
economy in three ways: it allows for the free flow of information, it 
reduces transaction costs, and it regulates behavior.  Before the 
advent of many of the technologies that connect our world, it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to access information about excess capacity 
at the individual level.  For example, before an app was created that 
would immediately tell you everyone in your vicinity who is willing to 
give you a ride the airport, you had to call a friend or your local taxi 
company, schedule a pickup, and hope the driver arrived on time.  
“Our limited access to information was a structural constraint on [the] 
supply for a given market.”43  It was not that people did not have 
excess capacity—we always had empty spare bedrooms and back 
seats—it was that there was no way to connect the people who 
needed something with the people who had it.  Specifically, 
technologies such as high-speed Internet, the Global Positioning 
System, open data, the ubiquity and low-cost of mobile phones, and 
social media made this possible.44  Sharing would struggle if it were 
                                                                                                                             
 39. Anjanette Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute 
Resolution in the Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 357, 377 (2015). 
 40. Tanz, supra note 21. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See infra Part I.C. 
 43. Hutch Carpenter, Harvesting Abundance in the Sharing Economy, HYPE 
INNOVATION BLOG (Sept. 10, 2014), http://blog.hypeinnovation.com/harvesting-
abundance-sharing-economy [perma.cc/DV7Z-PFBJ]. 
 44. Cf. Andrew Batey, Mobile + Sharing Economy + Internet of Things = the 
Coming Economic Boom, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237646 [perma.cc/GRY8-R8RN]. 
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not convenient, and sharing would never have been convenient 
without the free and instantaneous flow of information that 
technology made possible. 
Technology also allows for the reduction in transaction costs.  
Computerized systems allow for user-friendly and efficient search 
functions, nearly instantaneous payment processing, and fully 
integrated accounting functions among other things. 
Technology also is essential for regulating participant behavior via 
lex informatica.  Lex informatica is the concept involving the use of 
technological architectures to regulate the flow of information and 
require or prohibit certain actions.45  The effect of technology on 
behavior is similar to that of law and, at times, can go further, 
especially when the user has no choice but to follow the rules imposed 
by technology.  For example, if an eBay user failed to follow through 
with a transaction, she could be removed from the system.46 
3. Economic and Cultural Pressures 
Economic pressures also greatly contributed to the birth of the 
sharing economy.  It is no coincidence that many firms in the sharing 
economy were founded between 2008 and 2010, in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis.  People during this time “needed new ways 
to save money, as well as new ways to make it.”47  As suggested by 
Kevin Roose, the depressed labor market was a precondition for the 
sharing economy.48  With fewer full-time jobs, Americans were forced 
to take temporary work, and the sharing economy provided many 
sources of temporary or “gig” work. 
Millennial49 values also have driven people toward the sharing 
economy.  Due in part to the impact of the recession, millennials grew 
up with the mindset of preferring access over ownership—they 
                                                                                                                             
 45. Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998). 
 46. See, e.g., Unpaid Item Policy, EBAY, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/unpaid-item.html#additional [perma.cc/NUM9-
WNLE]. 
 47. Miller, supra note 14. 
 48. Kevin Roose, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Trust, It’s About 
Desperation, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/04/sharing-economy-is-about-
desperation.html. 
 49. Millennials include individuals born after 1980. The Generations Defined, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/sdt-next-
america-03-07-2014-0-06/ [perma.cc/EQ4A-VFGH]. 
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
“share[], rent[], or pay small transaction fees for access.”50  As stated 
by the co-founder and chief executive officer of Rent the Runway, a 
clothing sharing company, young people “are now in a state of mind 
where [they] want to acquire more experiences” as opposed to 
things.51  “The 1990s ‘MTV Cribs’ show-off-how-much-money-you-
have generation is over.”52 
B. Benefits of the Sharing Economy 
The sharing economy is shaking existing industries.  So why should 
we allow it to continue?  Why should we develop a new regulatory 
regime to address the problems created by this new economy?  The 
answer lies perhaps in its overwhelming benefits to society. 
Job Creation.  The sharing economy creates jobs by utilizing the 
existing capacity of individuals and their real and personal property.  
A resolution at the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting in June 2013 
stated that in the sharing economy, “companies have proven to be 
engines of innovation and job creation, driving economic 
development in the hearts of American cities, where joblessness is 
still most pervasive.”53  Participating in the sharing economy also 
enables people to be more entrepreneurial and pursue nontraditional 
forms of income generation.  For example, in Portland, Oregon, 
“45% of Airbnb hosts are self-employed, freelancers, or part-time 
workers, [and] 12% of hosts . . .  have used Airbnb income to support 
themselves while launching a new business.”54  Platforms themselves 
are also creating jobs.  “There are now 17 billion-dollar companies 
with over 60,000 employees in the sharing [] economy.”55 
                                                                                                                             
 50. Michael Costonis, Lead the Pack or Follow the Leader: Insuring Risk in the 
Sharing Economy, ACCENTURE 1, 3 (2014), 
http://nstore.accenture.com/IM/FinancialServices/AccentureLibrary/data/pdf/Insurin
g_Risk_Sharing_Economy.pdf. 
 51. Miller, supra note 14. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Approval of Resolution in Support of Policies for Shareable Cities, U.S. Conf. 
of Mayors, 81st Annual Meeting (June 2013), 
http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/81st_Conference/metro18.asp [perma.cc/LX54-
SJY5]. 
 54. Molly Turner, The Airbnb Community’s Economic Impact in Portland, 
AIRBNB (Apr. 22, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/airbnb-communitys-
economic-impact-portland/ [perma.cc/M54J-PSGU]. 
 55. Jeremiah Owyang, The Collaborative Sharing Economy Has Created 17 
Billion-Dollar Companies (and 10 Unicorns), WEB STRATEGY (June 4, 2015), 
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2015/06/04/the-collaborative-sharing-economy-
has-created-17-billion-dollar-companies-and-10-unicorns/[perma.cc/LZ32-C65T]. 
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The barriers to entry in the sharing economy are also very low.  
“Sharing leverages a wide variety of resources and [makes it easier to 
start] small businesses,” with the outsourcing of tasks and 
“innovations like shared workspaces, shared commercial kitchens, 
community-financed start-ups, community-owned commercial 
centers, and spaces for ‘pop-up’ businesses.”56  Anyone with a car or 
free time can participate in the sharing economy.  The opportunities 
for individuals to create their own microbusinesses to supplement or 
fully provide income are virtually unlimited. 
Environmental Benefits.  As for the environment, “the sharing 
economy blends the world of profitability and sustainability.”57  It 
minimizes manufacturing and distribution costs and reduces the need 
for capital-intensive infrastructure because products are shared 
locally.58  The sharing economy encourages people to reuse or recycle 
goods rather than buy new ones (for example, you can swap an old 
book for a different book with a swapping site).59  Furthermore, the 
sharing economy discourages waste by tapping into under-utilized 
assets.  For example, Uber reduces the number of cars we need to 
have on our roads or in our parking lots. 
An additional benefit of the sharing economy is that it offers a 
solution to the peak load problems that have been plaguing cities for 
decades.60  Consider a city hosting the Super Bowl.  It could much 
more easily accommodate an onslaught of out-of-towners if 
individuals were allowed to rent out their spare bedrooms, instead of 
building a new set of hotels that would oversupply the market much 
of the year. 
Competitive pricing.  Due in large part to the free flow of 
information and the increase in supply, sharing economy markets 
                                                                                                                             
 56. Janelle Orsi et al., Policies for Shareable Cities: A Sharing Economy Policy 
Primer for Urban Leaders, SHAREABLE 1, 30 (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/theselc/pages/209/attachments/original/139483
6950/policies_for_shareable_cities_selc_9_9_13.pdf?1394836950 [perma.cc/UHZ9-
R6BN]. 
 57. Sara Gutterman, ‘Sharing Economy’ Will Save Our Economy and the 
Environment, ENVTL. LEADER (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2014/07/17/sharing-economy-will-save-our-
economy-and-the-environment/#ixzz3K77vHFCl. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING 
PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE 
ECONOMIES (2012). 
 60. EconTalk: Michael Munger on the Sharing Economy, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY 
(July 7, 2014), http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2014/07/michael_munger.html 
[perma.cc/3QXJ-ELDX]. 
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often sell products and services at lower prices than their analogs in 
the non-sharing economy.61  Yochai Benkler has provided a thorough 
analysis of the “information collection cost” savings of peer-to-peer 
networks, and it appears that when such networks operate in a 
market, these savings accrue partly to the benefit of buyers in the 
form of lower prices.62  Prices are also lowered because key business 
functions are outsourced to platforms, thereby creating economies of 
scale. 
Greater product and service variety.  Another benefit of the 
sharing economy is its product and service variety.63  Because there 
are so many individual microbusinesses, there is more diversity in 
products and services available to meet the needs and interests of 
buyers.  For example, Handy is a marketplace for housecleaning and 
“handyman” work,64 while TaskRabbit and Mechanical Turk let 
people outsource a wide variety of tasks and services, ranging from 
simple errands and chores to website design.65 
As discussed, the sharing economy offers a number of advantages: 
jobs, more efficient and sustainable allocation of resources, lower 
prices, stronger communities, and greater access to services. Although 
the benefits of the sharing economy justify “special treatment,” a new 
regulatory structure must still serve the goals of regulation.  The 
question then becomes: How do we develop such a structure? 
                                                                                                                             
 61. A recent survey of U.S. adults familiar with the sharing economy found that 
eighty-six percent agree it makes life more affordable. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
THE SHARING ECONOMY: CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES 9 (2015), 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-
intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf [perma.cc/QL7V-YHML]; see also 
Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy 
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. Bus. 
Entrepreneurship & L. 529, 531–36 (2015), 
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol8/iss2/4/; Neil Irwin, Uber, Lyft and a 
Road Map for Reinventing the Ride, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2014), 
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 62. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of 
the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 407–15 (2002). 
 63. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 2 (1985). 
 64. About Us, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/about [https://perma.cc/UC39-
BRA5]. 
 65. How It Works, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works 
[https://perma.cc/U9FB-NU64]; Mechanical Turk, 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome [https://perma.cc/Z2SU-5V65]. 
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C. Drawbacks of the Sharing Economy 
To start the process of determining appropriate regulations for the 
sharing economy, drawbacks of the sharing economy must be 
identified.  
Consumer Safety.  The sharing economy puts an enormous number 
of people in inherently vulnerable positions—getting into someone’s 
car, inviting someone into your home, etc.  A score of high-profile 
incidents over the course of the past few years have highlighted the 
potential threats the sharing economy presents to consumer safety.66  
For example, in 2011, an Airbnb host came home to an aggressively 
ransacked apartment, finding her cash, credit cards, jewelry, and 
electronics missing, as well as evidence that the thieves had 
photocopied her birth certificate and social security number.67  
Additionally, Lyft was the subject of a widely publicized stalking 
episode involving a Lyft driver and his female passenger.68  While 
sharing economy platforms certainly want to reduce the number of 
these incidents, they wash their hands of responsibility for them.  
Platforms are thus criticized for profiting from transactions in the 
sharing economy without accepting all of their negative externalities.69 
The regulatory response to safety concerns has been either to ban 
sharing businesses from operating or to require them to obtain the 
same permits required of their competitors in the non-sharing 
economy for rooms, rides, and other services.70  For example, in early 
                                                                                                                             
 66. In the ride-sharing arena, the consumer protection website 
www.whosdrivingyou.com keeps a comprehensive list of safety incidents. See 
Complete List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, WHO’S DRIVING YOU?, 
http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents.html [perma.cc/J44M-Z36X]. 
 67. Michael Arrington, The Moment of Truth for Airbnb as User’s Home Is 
Utterly Trashed, TECHCRUNCH (July 27, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/27/the-
moment-of-truth-for-airbnb-as-users-home-is-utterly-trashed/ [perma.cc/XSY8-
TLTW]. 
 68. See Sam Biddle, When Your Smartphone Chauffeur Becomes a Stalker, 
VALLEYWAG (July 16, 2013), http://valleywag.gawker.com/when-your-smartphone-
chauffeur-becomesa-stalker-801080008/ [perma.cc/B526-LM4G]. 
 69. See Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION 
INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014), http://greattransition.org/publication/debating-the-sharing-
economy [perma.cc/5UH8-BRMB]. 
 70. See Lori Aratani, Competition from UberX, Lyft Has D.C. Taxis Crying Foul, 
WASH. POST (May 11, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/competition-from-uberx-
lyft-has-dc-taxis-crying-foul/2014/05/11/5920c866-d60a-11e3-8a78-
8fe50322a72c_story.html [perma.cc/MSN7-RWKG]; see also Rasier, LLC, Public 
Service Commission of South Carolina Directive, Docket No. 2014-372-T (2015), 
http://dms.psc.sc.gov/pdf/orders/5A23B2F8-155D-141F-23C07EAA18BA1E64.pdf 
[perma.cc/6DJD-NSXX] (ordering Uber to cease and desist operations in South 
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2014, the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles issued cease and 
desist letters to both Uber and Lyft, ordering them to stop operating 
their services in that state.71  Bans and permits are effective ways of 
protecting consumers from harm, but they have the serious potential 
to devastate sharing economy markets. 
Fraud.  Because the sharing economy often involves the exchange 
of personal information, including credit card data, people interested 
in committing fraud lurk throughout the sharing economy.  For 
example, HiGear, a car-sharing service focusing on luxury vehicles, 
was forced to shut down in early 2012 after a criminal ring used stolen 
identities and credit cards to bypass security checks and stole four 
cars totaling $400,000.72  Airbnb has also seen a substantial rise in the 
number of fake listings.  These listings:  
[F]irst target potential travelers on Airbnb by luring them into a 
potential property.  Using a composite of photos and details 
collected from the web, they construct an ideal vacation rental in a 
target market and then price it very competitively . . . [w]hen users 
reach out to book the property or learn more, the host tries to 
deliver links to an external site to collect booking data.  There, a 
credit card number is taken and the host disappears.73   
It is also possible for people wanting to commit fraud to take control 
of “a current account (likely through the bulk purchase of hacked 
passwords) and make false listings under an unsuspecting user’s 
name.”74 
                                                                                                                             
Carolina until a regulatory determination has been made); Katherine Driessen, Ride-
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 72. See Sarah Perez, Luxury Car-Sharing Service HiGear Shuts Down Due to 
Theft, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 1, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/01/luxury-car-
sharing-service-higear-shuts-down-due-to-theft/ [perma.cc/BLX7-CWA7]. 
 73. Grant Martin, Airbnb’s Next Big Challenge Is Keeping the Scammers Away, 
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 74. Id. 
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Currently, platforms deter fraud based on peer-reviews and the fact 
that the payments are typically only transferred to the microbusiness 
after a transaction is complete.  However, there is no regulatory check 
on whether these systems are effective, and remedies for individuals 
hurt by sharing economy fraud are typically limited to traditional 
common law tort claims. 
Privacy.  The widespread collection and use of data helps expand 
the array of services available in the sharing economy and keeps 
prices low.  Data about interactions is also what facilitates the 
reputational feedback mechanisms that are crucial for the 
development of trust among diverse and physically distant parties.  As 
the sharing economy becomes more “embedded into how people 
work, travel . . . , and shop, the digital exhaust from those actions 
creates associations and patterns that may be mined for insight, 
efficiencies, or more nefarious purposes.”75 
Currently, there are no specific privacy laws related to sharing 
economy platforms.  Therefore, contract law plays a key role, and, 
typically, platforms dictate the privacy terms because consumers have 
no individual bargaining power.76  For example:  
Uber’s privacy policy states that the app can gather and use users’ 
geo-location data for a variety of purposes, including “internal 
business purposes,” [even when the app is turned off].  The privacy 
policy, however, does not define what these purposes are.  So far, 
the company has reportedly used it for tracking [thirty] of its most 
“notable users” to display an activity map at a launch party.  It is 
                                                                                                                             
 75. Alex Howard, The Sharing Economy: Will Self-Regulation by Startups Suffice 
to Protect Consumers?, TECH REPUBLIC (Dec. 14, 2014), 
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 76. See generally User Privacy Statement, UBER (July 15, 2015), 
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reported that these users did not know their location coordinates 
were being used in such a way.77   
The Washington Post also reported that an Uber job applicant was 
able to access the company’s internal analytics and find the records of 
a family member of a prominent politician in Washington, D.C.78 
The fear of improper use of personal data is obvious and 
warranted.  Sharing economy data about people could be used for all 
sorts of improper purposes, including corporate espionage and 
manipulation of regulators.  And the only real legal limitation on 
platforms with regard to these one-sided terms comes from section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “Act”), which prohibits 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”79  
Recently, a complaint was filed with the FTC under section 5 against 
Uber.80  The complaint asks the FTC to investigate Uber’s business 
practices and to stop the company from collecting unnecessary 
location data under claims of “unfairness.”81  However, this complaint 
is the first of its kind, and it is unclear whether or not the FTC will 
take it seriously. 
Microbusiness Protections.  Similar to the contracts of adhesion 
entered into by consumers in the sharing economy, the 
microbusinesses participating in the sharing economy have very little 
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bargaining power vis-à-vis the platforms.  Most platforms in the 
sharing economy do not offer benefits or protections for 
microbusinesses because they view micro-entrepreneurs as 
independent contractors.82  This means that microbusinesses receive 
no paid sick or vacation days, 401(k) plans, health insurance, or life 
insurance.  As a result, workers must pay for their own benefits or do 
without them.  Although the Affordable Care Act does offer 
individuals a way to get health insurance, many benefit packages 
available are more costly than the options for corporations.  As for 
protections, there are no protections for microbusinesses with regard 
to discrimination, on-the-job injuries, minimum wage, or collective 
bargaining.83  These issues are currently being litigated in court, as 
many microbusinesses are trying to claim “employee” protections. 
Anticompetitive Behavior.  Traditional businesses that compete 
with sharing economy networks often argue that by avoiding the costs 
associated with obtaining permits and complying with other 
regulations that bind their competitors, sharing businesses are able to 
operate at lower costs.84  In addition, some argue that the sharing 
economy platforms are price-fixing by telling the individual 
businesses within the sharing economy what price they can charge.85  
The regulatory response to these claims of anticompetitive behavior 
has generally involved revising state or local antitrust laws and 
permitting laws to apply to sharing networks.86 
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D. Case Study: Airbnb and Uber 
By far the most prominent sharing services are those based around 
accommodations and cars.  This Part focuses on the two major 
sharing economy companies in these areas, Airbnb and Uber, and it 
outlines how the current regulatory landscape is affecting these 
companies. 
1. Airbnb 
The best-known example in the accommodation sphere is Airbnb, 
based in San Francisco.  Airbnb was founded in 2008 and is a “trusted 
community marketplace for people to list and book unique 
accommodations around the world,” either online or on a mobile 
phone.87  Airbnb lists more than 2,000,000 listings in more than 34,000 
cities and 190 countries.88  People, known as hosts, can list anything 
from a spare bed to a castle on the site and set rental rates and house 
rules (such as no smoking or pets).89  For facilitating the transaction, 
Airbnb takes a nine to fifteen percent commission on the rental fee.90  
At less than six years old, the company was already valued around 
$13 billion.91 
To ensure safety and promote trust, Airbnb does two main things: 
it encourages user reviews and facilitates a Verified ID process.  For 
reviews, hosts and guests can provide up to 500 words describing their 
experience.92  After writing a review, if a host or guest has not 
completed her review, the person is allowed to edit it for up to forty-
eight hours.93  In addition to writing reviews, guests may also submit a 
star rating.94  The number of stars displayed on a listing page is an 
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aggregate of the scores that different guests have given for that 
listing.95 
Airbnb will remove or alter a review if it violates its review 
guidelines.  Review guidelines include sticking to facts and providing 
constructive feedback for the host and community.96  Airbnb 
discourages personal insults, opinions that are not backed up by 
examples, and general unsociable behavior.97 
Verified ID works by connecting a user’s Airbnb profile with other 
sources of information.98  Airbnb hosts and guests say they look for a 
Verified ID badge before deciding to host or stay with someone.99  
During the Verified ID process, Airbnb may ask users to: take a 
photo or upload an image of a government-issued ID, such as a 
driver’s license or passport; connect another online profile to the 
Airbnb account, such as a Facebook, Google, or LinkedIn account; or 
upload an Airbnb profile photo and provide a phone number and 
email address.100 
Airbnb also creates a secure payment platform for booking.  When 
submitting a reservation request to a host, the guest provides payment 
details.101  If the reservation request is retracted, declined, or expires, 
Airbnb does not complete the charge and any authorization is 
released.102  If the reservation is accepted, the payment is processed 
and collected by Airbnb in full.  Airbnb then holds the payment until 
twenty-four hours after check-in, which gives both parties time to do 
a walkthrough upon check-in and make sure that everything is as 
expected.103 
On the guest side, Airbnb provides a Guest Refund Policy if a 
guest has a travel issue, such as: (1) a host cancellation shortly before 
check-in or failure on the part of the host to provide access to the 
listing booked; (2) a misrepresentation of promised amenities or 
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items; or (3) an unclean space.  The Guest Refund Policy is available 
to all Airbnb guests who have booked on the site, no matter the 
destination they are traveling to or their country of residence.104  On 
the host side, Airbnb also provides a Host Guarantee, which provides 
protection for up to $1,000,000 in damages to an eligible property in 
the event of guest damages that cannot be resolved directly with the 
guest.105 
Despite the measures that Airbnb has taken to ensure a safe and 
mutually beneficial exchange between hosts and guests, Airbnb has 
been met with resistance by local governments.  These legal problems 
mostly fall directly on hosts and users, as opposed to the platforms. 
This is because Airbnb, like most other sharing platforms, attempts to 
shift the risk of liability, by contract, onto its hosts and users.  As 
written, in all caps, in its terms of service: 
THE SITE [AIRBNB], APPLICATION AND SERVICES 
COMPRISE AN ONLINE PLATFORM THROUGH WHICH 
HOSTS MAY CREATE LISTINGS FOR ACCOMMODATIONS 
AND GUESTS MAY LEARN ABOUT AND BOOK 
ACCOMMODATIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE HOSTS.  YOU 
UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT AIRBNB IS NOT A 
PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO 
BETWEEN HOSTS AND GUESTS, NOR IS AIRBNB A REAL 
ESTATE BROKER, AGENT OR INSURER.  AIRBNB HAS NO 
CONTROL OVER THE CONDUCT OF HOSTS, GUESTS AND 
OTHER USERS OF THE SITE, APPLICATION AND 
SERVICES OR ANY ACCOMMODATIONS, AND DISCLAIMS 
ALL LIABILITY IN THIS REGARD TO THE MAXIMUM 
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW.106 
Without a specific statute or regulation, regulators cannot easily 
punish the platform, even if the platform users are violating the law or 
the scale of the platform disrupts communities.107  Regulators, 
therefore, must turn to regulating the hosts and address questions 
such as: “Are the new platforms fueling a black market for unsafe 
hotels? By bidding up the price of apartments in popular areas, do 
                                                                                                                             
 104. What is the Guest Refund Policy?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/324 [perma.cc/9H8H-KLFZ]. 
 105. Airbnb’s $1,000,000 Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/guarantee [perma.cc/MME7-QLS4].   
 106. Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms 
[https://perma.cc/QTG5-68VL]. 
 107. Cities have tried to fine platforms, but with little success. See, e.g., Edward 
Russo, City Fines Uber Over Licensing Violation, REGISTER-GUARD (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/City+fines+Uber+over+licensing+violation.-
a0395254414 [perma.cc/WUZ4-UXAL]. 
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short-term rentals make metropolitan areas like New York City less 
affordable? Is the influx of out-of-town visitors disturbing residential 
neighborhoods?”108 
New York City is a hotbed for Airbnb’s challenges.  Airbnb 
bookings in New York City saw a nearly twelvefold spike in recent 
years, rising from 20,808, in 2010, to an estimated 243,019, in 2014.109  
New York State asserts that seventy-two percent of Airbnb rentals in 
New York City are illegal.110  This is because New York housing law 
prohibits an owner or renter from renting her apartment in a Class A 
multiple dwelling111 to someone for less than thirty days, unless the 
owner or renter is also present.112  Therefore, if a host went away for 
the weekend and rented her apartment through Airbnb, the host 
would technically be breaking the law, and no permit or license could 
make the behavior legal.   
The purpose of this prohibition is understandable.  It is designed to 
protect guests, ensure proper fire and safety code compliance, and 
protect permanent residents who would be forced to “endure the 
inconvenience of hotel occupancy in their buildings.”113  It is also 
designed to preserve the supply of affordable permanent housing.114 
In places where it is not outright illegal to participate in Airbnb, 
hosts must comply with various regulations.  In Austin, Texas, for 
example, the city is enforcing new Short-Term Rental Licensing 
Ordinances.115  These ordinances require anyone who is leasing their 
home, apartment, guest bedroom, or couch on sites like Airbnb to 
obtain a license.116  In order to obtain a license, a host is subject to an 
inspection and must register with the city, show proof of occupancy, 
prove that local hotel occupancy taxes will be paid, and pay a $285 
fee.117  However, a host may only obtain a license if the maximum 
                                                                                                                             
 108. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y.’S RESEARCH DEP’T & INTERNET 
BUREAU, AIRBNB IN THE CITY 1 (2014), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf [perma.cc/88BH-2RJ7]. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. A “multiple dwelling” is a dwelling occupied by three or more families living 
independently. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4 (McKinney 2011).  A “Class A” 
multiple dwelling is one that is “occupied for permanent residence purposes,” which 
includes apartments, co-ops and condos. Id. 
 112. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4. 
 113. See N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, S. 
6873-B, 233RD LEG. (2010). 
 114. Id. 
 115. AUSTIN, TEX., Ordinance 20130926-144 (Sept. 26, 2013). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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number of Short-Term Rentals in the host’s area has not been 
exceeded.118  Those who operate without registration risk fines 
starting at $500 per night.119 
The problem with regulations like the one in Austin is that Airbnb 
hosts are operating at such a small scale they simply cannot afford to 
satisfy the licensing requirements.  As reported by Airbnb in 
Portland, Oregon, the typical Airbnb host occasionally rents out only 
the property in which he or she lives to help afford costs of living 
(sixty-five percent of Portland hosts have used Airbnb to afford their 
home), and the typical host earns only $6860 per year in Airbnb 
income.120  Furthermore, regulation has proved evasive and has 
required costly proactive measures in Austin.121  Similarly, San 
Francisco (which has regulations like Austin’s) maintains that 
regulations are “unenforceable” without more cooperation from 
platforms.122 
2. Uber 
Car-sharing schemes divide into peer-to-peer car-rental services in 
which you pay to borrow someone else’s car (Buzzcar, Getaround, 
Turo, etc.) and taxi-like services (Uber, Lyft, SideCar, etc.) in which 
people use their cars to ferry paying passengers.  The most popular 
company in the taxi-like service realm is Uber.  Uber started in San 
Francisco, which is notorious for spotty cab service.123  Instead of 
hailing a cab the old fashion way, the Uber app originally allowed for 
users to request an idling commercial, full-size luxury car to pick them 
                                                                                                                             
 118. There is a cap on the number of short-term rentals allowed in each census 
tract of the city. AUSTIN, TEX., Ordinance 20130926-144; see also Type 2 STR’s by 
PerCent, AUSTINTEXAS.GOV (Apr. 20, 2015), 
https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Type_2_STR_s_by_PerCent-4-20-
2015.pdf [perma.cc/2S8P-PF6S]. 
 119. AUSTIN, TEX., Ordinance 20130926-144. 
 120. Molly Turner, The Airbnb Community’s Economic Impact in Portland, 
AIRBNB (Apr. 22, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/airbnb-communitys-
economic-impact-portland/ [perma.cc/5BUG-7ZVU]. 
 121. Robert Roldan, Other Cities Warn of Airbnb Regulation Pitfalls, COURIER-J. 
(Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/money/2015/07/30/cities-warn-
airbnb-regulation-pitfalls/30896135/?from=global&sessionKey=&autologin= 
[perma.cc/5ED6-AA32]. 
 122. See Matier & Ross, ‘No Way of Enforcing’ Airbnb Law, S.F. Planning Memo 
Says, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-
ross/article/No-way-of-enforcing-Airbnb-law-S-F-planning-6151592.php. 
 123. Uber—What’s Fueling Uber’s Growth Engine?, GROWTHHACKERS, 
https://growthhackers.com/companies/uber/ [perma.cc/VMC3-5JXH]. 
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up.124  In 2012, Uber launched its “uberX” service,125 which expanded 
service to any qualified driver with an acceptable vehicle.126  UberX 
drivers can turn on their Uber app whenever they want and receive 
eighty percent of the fares.127 
With the current version of Uber, passengers open the app and 
choose which kind of car service they want (from a standard car to a 
limousine).  The app then sends the user’s GPS coordinates to nearby 
cars.  Once a driver is confirmed, which usually happens after a few 
seconds, the user is shown the driver’s name, license plate number, 
and rating.  The user also sees the driver’s route and estimated time 
of arrival.  Users then tell the driver where to go, and after the user is 
dropped off, the user’s credit card is charged and a receipt is emailed 
to the user—no cash, not even a tip, is exchanged.  Users and drivers 
then rate each other, as an incentive to be good customers and 
drivers.128 
Uber sets the fares for each service in each city based on its own 
formula, which is calculated using either a per mile rate or a per 
minute rate, on top of a base fare of a few dollars.  When demand for 
a car is high—during inclement weather or rush hours—customers are 
alerted of “surge pricing,” which the company says is a way to 
incentivize more drivers to get on the streets to accommodate all 
those customers.129 
UberX insures passenger safety and well-being in three ways.  
First, it conducts “rigorous screening and background checks” on 
drivers.130  Second, the company “regularly reviews all feedback, 
meaning that we can ensure a safe and respectful environment for all 
parties.”131  Third, the company provides end-to-end commercial 
                                                                                                                             
 124. Edmund Ingham, Start-Ups Take Note: Uber Made It Big, But Did They Get 
It Right?,  FORBES (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edmundingham/2014/12/05/start-ups-take-note-uber-
made-it-big-but-did-they-get-it-right/. 
 125. Since traditional Uber services like UberBlack and UberTaxi are regulated 
like traditional for-hire car services and taxi companies, this Article focuses 
exclusively on uberX, which only utilizes individuals with excess capacity. 
 126. UberX vehicles must be 2008 model cars or newer. Vehicle Requirements, 
UBER, http://www.driveubernyc.com/cars/ [perma.cc/4GY4-T6G7]. 
 127. Bill Gurley, A Deeper Look at Uber’s Dynamic Pricing Model (Mar. 12, 
2014), http://blog.uber.com/dynamicpricing [perma.cc/SH7X-PUTH]. 
 128. Ride, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/ [https://perma.cc/5N84-NBEJ]. 
 129. Surge pricing multiplies fares during peak demand hours. Id. 
 130. Nairi Houdajian, Expanded Background Checks, UBER NEWSROOM, (Feb. 12, 
2014), https://blog.uber.com/expandedbackgroundchecks [perma.cc/8K2G-QWYC]. 
 131. Erin Griffith, In a Bitter Fight for Customers, Uber and Lyft Begin to Self-
Destruct, FORTUNE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/08/13/uber-and-lyft-self-
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liability insurance.132  For the screenings and background checks, all 
drivers are screened against the following: 
 county courthouse records going back seven years for every 
county of residence, 
 federal courthouse records going back seven years, 
 multi-State Criminal Database going back seven years, 
 national Sex Offender Registry screen, 
 lifetime Social Security Trace, and 
 historical and ongoing Motor Vehicle Records. 
In order to pass Uber’s screening test, drivers may not have any of 
the following: 
 DUI or other drug related driving violations, 
 severe infractions, hit and runs, or fatal accidents, 
 history of reckless driving, 
 violent crimes, 
 sexual offenses, 
 gun-related violations, 
 resisting/evading arrest, or 
 driving without insurance or suspended license charge in the 
past three years.133 
As for the reviews, Uber drivers are rated on a scale of one to five 
stars.  According to several Internet sources, Uber will deactivate 
drivers if the rating dips below a certain average.134 
UberX insures driver safety by providing drivers with feedback on 
riders so a driver can make an informed decision about whether or 
not to pick up a rider.  In addition, if a rider is abusive toward a driver 
or otherwise violates Uber’s terms of service, the rider will lose access 
to the system.135 UberX also provides contingent liability coverage 
                                                                                                                             
destruct-first-sabotage-and-smear-campaigns-now-ratings-bribery/ [perma.cc/29CJ-
355Y] (quoting Nairi Houdajian, Uber’s communication chief). 
 132. See Safe Rides, Safer Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/safety 
[perma.cc/AU53-LX6U]. 
 133. Details on Safety, UBER (July 15, 2015), 
http://newsroom.uber.com/2015/07/details-on-safety/ [perma.cc/K5QH-SCDZ]. 
 134. See Griffith, supra note 131.  The rating has to be higher than a 4.6 or 4.7 
according to several online sources (Uber does not release the actual number). See 
id.; see also Ansel Herz, Drivers Decry “Predatory” Uber, STRANGER (Apr. 11, 
2014), http://www.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2014/04/11/drivers-decry-predatory-
uber&view=comments [perma.cc/4EWS-6XHJ]. 
 135. See Safe Rides, Safer Cities, supra note 132. 
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when the Uber app is on and the driver is not on a trip, and 
commercial insurance when the driver is on a trip.136 
Uber is incredibly popular.  It provides over 100,000 rides per week 
in most major cities and has estimated revenue of between $1.5 and 
$2 billion each year.137  At the same time, around the world, taxi 
organizations have staged protests and lobbied their local 
governments to more strictly regulate companies like Uber.138  In 
response, cities have reacted by passing new regulations or enforcing 
old ones.  For example, Seattle has passed legislation that will limit 
the number of ride-sharing drivers from Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar at 
any one time.139  An ordinance passed in Chicago places a cap on 
surge pricing and requires drivers to complete background checks and 
drug tests.140  Other municipalities, such as Philadelphia, have even 
gone so far as to impound cars of ride-sharing drivers in an attempt to 
discourage this type of activity.141 
Some jurisdictions, like New York City, require uberX drivers to 
obtain special licenses.142  Licenses are required to make sure that 
vehicles carrying the public are properly maintained and operated by 
responsible drivers.  The requirements can be lengthy—for example, 
in order to operate as an uberX143 in New York City, an uberX driver 
must provide documentation of the following: 
                                                                                                                             
 136. See Insurance for UberX with Ridesharing, UBER NEWSROOM (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://blog.uber.com/ridesharinginsurance [perma.cc/R5YC-ZNE4]. 
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and Growth Metrics, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2014), 
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 139. See generally SEATTLE, WASH., Ordinance 124441 (Nov. 30, 2014). 
 140. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE OF CHI. § 9-115 (2014). 
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P9B2]. 
 142. See 35 R.C.N.Y. § 55-03 (2015). 
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while the time between ordering an Uber and having the Uber arrive is short, a user 
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 Zero outstanding judgments to the NYC Taxi & Limousine 
Commission, New York State Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) Traffic Violations Bureau, Department of 
Finance (DOF) Parking Violations, DOF Red Light Bureau 
(i.e., unpaid tickets) and Commercial Motor Vehicles Tax, 
 Child support certificate, 
 Current for-hire insurance certificate in the applicant’s 
name, 
 Current insurance declaration page directly from the 
insurance company showing the levels of insurance 
coverage, 
 Current DMV registration, bill of sale or leasing agreement, 
certificate of origin or certificate of title, 
 Government issued photo I.D., 
 Social Security card, and 
 Business entity documents.144 
In addition, drivers must pay a new application fee of $550, an 
inspection fee of $75, and a commercial motor vehicle tax of $800.145  
Only upon meeting all such requirements may drivers share their car. 
For most transportation microbusinesses, the license requirements 
and fees are simply too much to bear.  Most Uber drivers are 
supplementing income from other sources.146  While they are earning 
some money, it is not as much as one might think.  Though they 
receive roughly eighty percent of the fare that Uber charges, the 
drivers are responsible for vehicle financing, tolls, gas, car insurance, 
health insurance, retirement, self-employment taxes, and vehicle 
                                                                                                                             
is not technically “hailing” a cab from the street.  Instead, they are prearranging a 
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maintenance.147  The Uber driver nets only a few dollars an hour, 
according to many Uber drivers.148 
II.  DEFINING THE SHARING ECONOMY 
A. Defining the Sharing Economy 
The next step to develop an effective set of regulations for the 
sharing economy requires a clear definition of what the sharing 
economy is and is not. This section identifies four distinct features of 
sharing economy markets.  These characteristics include: platforms, 
microbusinesses, excess capacity, and high-powered information 
exchange. 
1.  Platforms 
Platforms in the sharing economy enable commercial transactions 
by linking sellers of products or services with buyers of those products 
or services.  These platforms are peer-to-peer in that they are 
decentralized on both sides of the platform, in contrast to single-sided 
platforms, which follow Coasian149 norms and offer their own 
products or services to potential buyers (for example, 
Amazon.com).150  The intermediary for the Airbnb network runs the 
website.151  The intermediaries for car services such as Uber, Lyft, and 
Sidecar create and manage mobile phone applications to connect 
drivers to passengers.152  These platforms collect and distill 
                                                                                                                             
 147. See Peter Ashlock, How Much Money Does an Average Uber or UberX 
Driver Earn in a Day?, QUORA (July 17, 2015), http://www.quora.com/How-much-
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 149. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
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 151. About Us, supra note 87. 
 152. Our Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/W74K-
J7SJ]. 
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information about users to make for open and transparent 
interactions.153 
Platforms greatly reduce the transaction costs of doing business.154  
They standardize the terms of trade, provide a wealth of information 
about the markets via sophisticated websites, and facilitate payments.  
For example, in the Airbnb network, individual hosts have 
outsourced to Airbnb the tasks of determining market demand, 
advertising, maintaining a stable supply of customers, and facilitating 
payments.155  Without the platform, supply-side users would have to 
perform each of these tasks on their own.156  For many people 
involved in these networks, the costs of performing such tasks on 
their own would be unacceptably cost-prohibitive.157  Platforms also 
monitor and sanction participant behavior.  Platforms use technology 
and feedback systems to monitor and remove users who pose a threat 
to consumer well-being or satisfaction. 
Platforms are highly involved in many aspects of sharing economy 
transactions.  This distinguishes them from mere informational 
resources such as Craigslist and classified ads.  They also can use lex 
informatica to control user behaviors; they are thus excellent tools for 
regulators.  
2. Microbusinesses 
In the sharing economy, platforms are coordinating intermediaries, 
and supply-side users are microbusinesses as opposed to employees of 
platforms.  This distinction helps focus on new approaches to regulate 
platforms—as opposed to treating them as traditional firms with 
armies of employees. 
Platforms view supply-side users as independent contractors 
because that classification reduces burdens related to labor and 
employment laws—such as unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation, tax responsibilities, etc..  The independent contractor 
classification also absolves platforms of liability for harm caused by 
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 154. See generally Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local 
Governmental Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” 
(George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Paper Series No. 15-01, 2015), 
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 156. See Geron, supra note 4. 
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peer-to-peer interactions.158  However, because various tests for 
distinguishing employees from independent contractors are often 
factor tests, it is sometimes unclear exactly where supply-side users 
fall on the employee/independent contractor dichotomy.   
Pursuant to the common law “right-to-control” test, an agent is an 
employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, if the principal 
has the right to control the physical details of the work performed by 
the agent.159  The principal not only directs the end result, but also 
controls how the employee completes the work.  Applying this test to 
Airbnb, it is easy to argue that hosts control.  The platform leaves to 
the hosts decisions about how to list and advertise their properties, 
how much to charge for rental, whom to choose as renters, the terms 
of rental, and even the method of payment.160  If the result of the 
contracting relationship between the intermediary and the hosts is to 
rent properties for short terms, then this particular sharing network 
plainly treats hosts as independent contractors who control the means 
and manner of the work. 
The broader Restatement test used by some courts to define the 
line between employees and independent contractors leads to similar 
conclusions.161  Of the ten factors for consideration, factors such as 
                                                                                                                             
 158. See Kirsner Scott, In the Sharing Economy, a Rift Over Worker 
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control, whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business (the platform is a technology company, the other is akin to 
an innkeeper), the place of work, the length of time agent is 
employed, the method of payment (by task instead of by time), and 
belief of the parties all suggest an independent contractor 
relationship.162 
For taxi-like services, such as Uber, the analysis is much less 
clear.163  Uber remains steadfast in its claim that drivers hold 
independent contractor status.  On the sign-up page for potential 
drivers to join Uber, the wording is unmistakable: “Drive with Uber 
and earn great money as an independent contractor.  Get paid weekly 
just for helping our community of riders get rides around town.  Be 
your own boss and get paid in fares for driving on your own 
schedule.”164 
Uber spokesman, Taylor Bennett, further clarified Uber’s position 
on driver classification when he stated: “They’re independent 
contractors.  We don’t hire drivers.  We’re a technology company.  
We provide the app that they use, that connects passengers with 
drivers.  They have the flexibility of being their own boss.”165  Uber 
drivers are indeed entirely flexible as to when he or she chooses to 
work (as long as they give at least one ride every 180 days on uberX 
or every 30 days on UberBlack).166  In addition, they never have to 
accept any requests for rides Uber generates, and they can completely 
control how they get from point A to point B for the rides they do 
accept.167  However, Uber does instruct drivers on how to interact 
with passengers, the prices to be charged (including the controversial 
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surge pricing system),168 the terms and forms of payment, and the type 
and look of their vehicles.169  It also has a system by which passengers 
can rate drivers—with a consequence of “deactivation” for drivers 
whose ratings fall below a certain level.170  In short, Uber manages 
many more aspects of the means and manner of the work performed 
by the drivers.  Not surprisingly, many of the factors comprising the 
more fact-sensitive agency test also point in the direction of treating 
Uber’s drivers as employees rather than independent contractors.171 
Instead of classifying Uber drivers and other supply-side users in 
the sharing economy as either employees or independent contractors, 
regulators should create a new classification.172  This new classification 
has been identified as “dependent contractors,” or for the purposes of 
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this Article “microbusinesses”—workers who fall between clear-cut 
employees and traditional independent contractors.173  This new 
classification would enable regulators to think differently about how 
to fill regulatory gaps.  They might, for example, find it more useful to 
focus on regulating platforms because they are dependent on the 
supply-side users. 
3. Excess Capacity 
Another distinguishing feature of the sharing economy is its 
utilization of excess capacity.174  Manufacturers use the term “excess 
capacity” to refer to “an underutilized asset that is not being fully 
exploited to create value, be it an idle assembly line or a factory 
running only one shift when it could potentially be running two or 
three.”175  In the sharing economy, people have excess capacity in 
their things, space, and time, and it is this excess capacity that supply-
side users are monetizing for their own benefit.176  For the most part, 
microbusiness are not acquiring new assets to leverage or sell.177 
This excess capacity feature of the sharing economy is a fickle one, 
especially as more and more users of sharing economy platforms are 
putting new assets online and forming traditional hotels, cleaning 
services, etc.  If supply-side users are hiring employees, purchasing 
space and assets, and using sharing economy platforms to sell them, 
they are acting more like traditional firms and should be treated as 
such.  If platforms want a new regulatory framework to apply to 
them, they must carefully filter out traditional firms from 
microbusinesses.  For example, in order to distinguish a site like 
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Airbnb from an online travel agent (such as Expedia), participation 
must be limited to microbusinesses with individual excess capacity.  
This is possible with technology, but this issue is by far one of the 
most fluid aspects of the sharing economy that needs clear definition. 
4. High-Powered Information Exchange 
As described above, technology is essential for high-powered 
information exchange in sharing economy markets.178  Participants in 
the sharing economy upload information to sharing economy 
platforms (personal information, credit card data, product and service 
availability, etc.) so that supply-side users and consumers can quickly 
be matched for their specific transaction.  With the sharing economy, 
there is a constant free-flow exchange of information. 
The characteristics discussed in this Part define sharing businesses 
and demonstrate how the behaviors in the sharing economy are 
qualitatively different than traditional firms.  To oversimplify, these 
features are also what current regulations ignore.  While it is possible 
to find many businesses that are similar to sharing economy platforms 
(Craigslist, Tupperware, FedEx, etc.), none incorporate all four 
dimensions—platforms, microbusinesses, excess capacity, and 
technology.  To the contrary, non-sharing economy firms are 
traditional in most respects, such as form of organization, ownership 
of business assets, and internalized use of information to leverage 
assets for a profit.179 
B. The Sharing Economy’s Current Regulatory Landscape 
Periodically, our society generates “disruptive innovations” like the 
sharing economy.180  Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen 
introduced the idea of disruptive innovations to describe technologies 
that undermine and eventually displace established products, firms, or 
even entire industries.181  Classic examples include automobiles, 
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personal computing, and cellular phones.182  The sharing economy is 
not only considered by many to be a disruptive innovation,183 but it is 
also, in the words of Nathan Cortez, creating a “regulatory 
disruption.”184 
Currently, cities and towns across the United States are taking one 
of three general approaches to regulate the sharing economy.  The 
first approach involves banning platforms outright.  This has been 
particularly true for ride-sharing platforms, such as Uber and Lyft, 
and house-sharing platforms, such as Airbnb, in many cities 
throughout the United States.185  The second approach involves 
authorities imposing regulatory structures designed for non-sharing 
economy businesses.  These structures are very often ill-fitted for the 
specifics of the sharing economy and, as a result, regulators enforce 
those regulations sporadically—turning a blind eye in some instances 
and enforcing rules in others.186  Authorities taking a novel approach 
work with platforms directly to reach some sort of common ground.  
For example, the California Public Utility Commission worked with 
several ride-sharing companies to develop new regulations for the 
industry.187 
There are significant problems with each approach.  The first 
approach—the outright ban of the platforms—cuts off the potential 
economic and environmental benefits of the sharing economy.  The 
second—imposing ill-fitting regulations or turning a blind eye—is not 
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sustainable, puts consumers at risk, and gives supply-side users188 an 
unfair advantage over traditional industries.  As Airbnb founder 
Nathan Blecharczyk states, “we’re not advocating that there shouldn’t 
be rules.  We’re just saying that things have evolved and it’s worth 
taking a fresh look from the ground up.”189  The third, novel approach 
is often reactionary and piecemeal, because these new regulations are 
not grounded in a clear conceptual understanding of what the sharing 
economy is.  The sharing economy must be viewed as a new form of 
market driven by technology and be regulated as such.190 
III.  A NEW ECONOMY, A NEW FRAMEWORK 
Under the traditional “public interest theory” of regulation, 
regulation is sought to protect consumers from structural problems 
known as market failures.191  These structural problems can include 
inadequate competition, uncompensated negative externalities,192 
asymmetrical information,193 and unequal bargaining power.194  When 
market failures occur, regulation may be supplied as a corrective 
measure.195  For example, cities in the United States have been 
regulating taxicabs with safety, insurance, and service standards since 
the 1920s in response to the early days of dangerous cars and 
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inadequate compensation for accident victims.196  To address market 
failures in the new sharing economy, regulators must find a coherent 
path between no regulations at all and the imposition of ill-fitted 
regulations from the non-sharing sector.   
Why should the sharing economy be permitted to play by different 
rules?  The sharing economy serves a very positive role in society.  
First, the sharing economy is more efficient than traditional 
businesses.  As described above, it allows for existing resources of 
individuals to be put to their best use with zero-marginal costs.197  This 
is a meaningful attribute of the sharing economy because it creates a 
sustainable use of resources.  Second, the sharing economy provides 
great benefits for the economy, because it allows microbusinesses to 
profit from existing resources.  Third, allowing the sharing economy 
to continue to grow and evolve has the potential to bring unforeseen 
benefits.  As argued by Sofia Ranchordas, the sharing economy needs 
to be regulated in an “innovation-friendly” way, meaning that it must 
be regulated in a transparent, consistent, and flexible way.198  The 
social benefits of innovations for the growth and development of a 
country are indisputable.199  In the last decade, different social and 
technological innovations have contributed substantially to the 
improvement of living standards and enhanced the diversity, quality, 
and safety of products in the market.200 
Although the benefits of the sharing economy justify “special 
treatment,” this new structure must still serve the desired ends of 
regulation.  The section below describes the means to serve those 
ends by regulating platforms instead of supply-side and end-users.  
A. Platform Regulation to Prevent Fraud and Promote Safety 
Issues of fraud prevention and safety are of the upmost importance 
to regulators.  However, instead of requiring a complex compliance 
structure for supply-side users, we should place responsibility on the 
platforms to ensure against fraud and unnecessary dangers.  Placing 
non-delegable responsibilities on platforms will encourage platforms 
                                                                                                                             
 196. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & 
Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 76–77 (1996). 
 197. See supra Section I.B. 
 198. Sofia Ranchordás, Innovation-Friendly Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation, 
the Sunrise of Innovation, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 223 (2015). 
 199. Id. at 208. 
 200. Robert Cooter, et al., The Importance of Law Promoting Innovation and 
Growth, RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH 
LEGAL REFORM 1–2 (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation ed., 2011). 
2016] BETWIXT AND BETWEEN 67 
to better screen participants, inspect shared assets, and regulate 
supply-side use.201 
In addition, placing non-delegable responsibilities on platforms will 
encourage platforms to maintain accurate feedback systems so they 
are less likely to be improperly manipulated or hacked.  If the 
feedback systems are accurate, then modern trust will guide user 
decisions and help the sharing economy naturally regulate itself...  
Users of the sharing economy are already operating under a system of 
modern trust that does not require the traditional safeguards that 
licensing statutes and other regulations create.  For example, an 
Airbnb guest looking for a place to stay would likely refuse to select 
an unrated Airbnb host; instead, she would select a host that has been 
reviewed many times by the community. 
Methods for keeping the feedback system accurate include: 
creating a consistent rating mechanism that allows for written 
comments, providing users with a meaningful opportunity to respond 
to feedback, providing a moderator to censor inappropriate or 
“unfair” feedback (similar to Airbnb’s system), and implementing an 
algorithm that helps scrub the data for confederate reviews (similar to 
the system used by review sites such as Tripadvisor and Yelp).202 
B. Platform Regulation to Generate Tax Revenue 
Solving regulators’ revenue woes is quite simple: require the 
platforms to collect and pay taxes.  There are two reasons supply-side 
users of the sharing economy avoid paying taxes.  The first reason is 
because it is easy to underreport in peer-to-peer transactions, 
especially for state taxes, such as sales and innkeepers taxes.203  
Second, as suggested by Airbnb founder Nathan Blecharcyk, a lot of 
hosts are afraid to pay taxes because they fear that if they pay the tax, 
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they will give away their identity and will be punished for violating a 
short-term rental law.204 
Both of these reasons for underreporting would be eliminated if 
platforms were required to pay appropriate taxes in addition to filing 
1099s.  Furthermore, it appears that platforms are willing to pay taxes.  
For example, Airbnb began collecting a fourteen percent Transient 
Occupancy Tax in San Francisco in October of 2014, and Uber 
collects taxes when required by law.205 
C. Platform Regulation to Allocate Risk 
Regulations designed to allocate risk in the traditional economy 
often fail to efficiently serve the sharing economy goals.  One 
traditional regulatory mechanism to allocate risk—the requirement to 
carry insurance—presents a unique problem when applied to players 
in the sharing economy.  When there are multiple players in the 
execution of the “sharing” of an asset, who should be obligated to 
insure against liability arising out of that sharing: the supply-side 
provider, the platform operator, or the user?  Moreover, if a supply-
side provider is using a traditionally private asset for commercial gain, 
does traditional insurance provide coverage? 
App-based ride services have been at the center of such questions 
recently.  In California, for example, district attorneys are 
complaining to state regulators that, because drivers’ private 
insurance policies typically exclude coverage for commercial use of 
their vehicles, the platform essentially encourages insurance fraud.206  
In short, drivers are incentivized to lie if they get into an accident, by 
claiming they were driving for personal reasons.  Generally, the 
carriers for the private drivers have no way to detect this type of 
fraud.207 
Once again, the regulatory goal of risk allocation can be met in this 
instance by regulating the platform.  Platform operators, which are 
already beginning to voluntarily provide insurance for platform-
related liability, could be required to provide primary insurance for 
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platform-related activity.  Furthermore, the platform could be 
required to mandate that its users report all accidents arising out of 
commercial activity to the platform.  Under such a structure, 
incentives to commit insurance fraud are eliminated, and any increase 
in cost to the platform can simply be accommodated in the 
fee/commission structure, thereby allowing the market to more 
appropriately allocate risk. 
 
D. Platform Regulation to Ensure Fair Competition 
From taxi drivers to hoteliers, many traditional businesses have 
argued that the sharing economy creates an unfair playing field.208  
Specifically, some individual supply-side-platform users are using the 
platforms on such a scale that they actually look like their non-sharing 
economy counterparts.  For example, according to the office of the 
New York State Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, almost half 
of Airbnb’s $1.45 million in 2010 revenue in New York City came 
from hosts who had at least three listings on the site.209  There were 
only 119 of these users, a small minority, claiming a large share of the 
business.210  These “superusers” are effectively operating like 
traditional businesses because they are developing new capacity, as 
opposed to utilizing excess capacity, and are truly exploiting the 
system. 
If, in response to these well-founded complaints, regulators simply 
imposed the existing regulatory structure on the sharing economy 
participants, the benefits of the sharing economy would be stifled.  If, 
on the other hand, no regulations are imposed, the unfair competition 
precipitated by the large-scale use of the platforms will be allowed to 
continue.  Again, the balance can be best struck by a middle road 
solution—rules that serve regulatory goals without compromising 
sharing economy benefits.  In this case, to avoid the platform 
“superuser” problem, regulators should require platforms to limit the 
scale of use of their services by any individual member.  For example, 
Airbnb could be required to limit the number of listings a single user 
can put online to one or two.  By doing so, no single user will be able 
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to manipulate the system by “creating” new capacity rather than 
efficiently using excess capacity and unfairly competing with the non-
sharing economy players. 
CONCLUSION 
The sharing economy is here to stay.  As Marcus Wohlsen from 
Wired Magazine observes, the sharing economy is reaching a point 
where it is becoming “too big to ban.”211  Uber and other sharing 
platforms have prioritized popularity over profit in order to grow, and 
they believe if the sharing economy gets big enough quickly enough, 
the political price will become too high for any elected official to try 
to stop it.212  And they are not wrong; people, especially millennials, 
embrace the sharing economy. 
The sharing economy needs to be regulated, but it needs to be 
regulated in a smart and novel way that allows people to share 
resources and utilize modern trust without compromising fraud 
prevention, safety, fair competition, and other regulatory goals.213 
Regulators will always be confronted with new products, 
technologies, and business practices that fall within their jurisdiction 
but do not fit comfortably within their existing regulatory 
frameworks. In the face of regulatory disruption, regulators should be 
flexible and willing to promote innovation with clear and consistent 
rules.  In the case of the sharing economy, they must learn about and 
embrace the sharing economy’s unique features and utilize platforms 
to accomplish regulatory goals.    
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